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A pseudo-panel was built to estimate the determinants of the labor participation decision 
of married women between 1984 and 2000. Past participation decisions, education level, 
labor income taxes, children between 1 and 2 years of age, and the presence of other 
people unemployed at home are the main explanatory variables of married women’s labor 
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1. Introduction 
The decision to join to the labor force is a topic of long-standing tradition in economics (see 
Heckman, 1993; Blundell and Macurdy, 1999; Pencavel, 1986). Noticeably, an important 
portion of the research in this area has been devoted to the study of the participation of 
married women (see Mincer, 1962; Gronau, 1973; Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986; among 
many others). This is because such a decision of married women has represented some 
important challenges to researchers that have sometimes been adequately captured by both 
economic and econometric models. Among these challenges are the proxies that have been 
used for the potential market wage (human capital acquisitions, experience, age, probability of 
transitory leaves for fertility decisions, etc.) and the reservation wage (non-labor income, 
including the husband’s wage, fertility decisions, in particular, the presence of young children 
and the cost of child care, etc.). 
  Labor participation in Colombia has been studied, from a static point of view, using the 
independent cross-sections data provided by the National Housing Survey (NHS) (see López, 
2001; Santamaría and Rojas, 2001; Tenjo and Ribero, 1998; and, Arango and Posada, 2005). 
Intertemporal models of labor supply have been implemented to capture the behavior of 
participation within a life-cycle framework (MaCurdy, 1981; Altonji, 1986; Heckman and 
MaCurdy, 1980) taking into account aspects related to interest rates, labor income taxes, and 
fertility. For Colombia, unfortunately, there is a lack of research that focuses on the life-cycle 
behavior of the extensive margin of the labor supply regardless of the advantages of this 
approach. The explanation lays in the fact that there is no panel data in Colombia on 
household labor market supply. In spite of this weakness of Colombian statistics, Sánchez and 
Núñez (2002) undertook a pseudo-panel approach to study some household behavior 
characteristics including labor force participation. 
  In this work, following Deaton (1985) a pseudo-panel is conformed in order to observe 
some life-cycle properties of labor force participation. Independent cross-sections, based on the 
quarter stages of NHS for the seven biggest cities between 1984 and 2000, are transformed into 
population cohorts; the sample mean of each cohort is computed and used as a panel. Then 
different models of participation for married women (or those in common-law unions) are 
estimated to asses the main determinants of the labor participation decision.   2
  The model attempts to capture the behavior of labor participation over time, the main 
recent findings related to fertility decisions (see Nakamura and Nakamura, 1992; Carrasco, 2001; 
Chun and Oh, 2002; Attanasio et al. 2004, etc.), and memory of labor participation decisions 
(true state dependence) (Heckman, 1981; Hyslop, 1999; Carro, 2003; etc.). The results of the 
regressions are in line with the theory, intuition, and findings in other countries. 
  This article develops as follows: Section 1 is this introduction. Section 2 establishes the 
model. Section 3 shows the characteristics of the cohorts and some stylized facts derived from the 
pseudo-panel. Section 4 explains the empirical approach and presents and discusses the results. 
Finally, Section 5 draws some conclusions. 
 
2. A model for labor participation over time 
The aim of this paper is to check the power of some potential determinants of married women’s 
labor participation when they make this decision during the course of their lives. Among the 
determinants are interest rates, labor income taxes, education level, age, non-labor income, and 
the cost of child care, this latter factor being neatly connected to fertility decisions. This section 
develops a model in which these variables appear as determinants of the extensive component of 
the labor supply
1. 
  Consider a married woman whose problem is to maximize the present value of discounted 
utility over a finite lifetime: 
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where  Ω is a monotonically increasing function,  ) (⋅ u  is the periodic utility flow, α  is the 
discount factor,  t c  is consumption at age t, total hours available for the woman are normalized 
to 1 and used to work in the market,  t n , or leisure time,  t l , such that  t t l n + = 1 , and,  t x  is a 
vector of characteristics of the family in period t, which accounts for observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity both over time and across families. If the woman decides to work she will 
undergo a welfare loss but, on the other hand, the labor income will allow her to increase 
consumption. If she decides to work, her after-tax income net of the costs of childcare and 
some others is:  
                                                           
1 This model compiles elements of Carrasco (1998), Hyslop (1999), and Attanasio et al. (2004).    3
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where  t w  is the wage,  t y  the non-labor income,  t τ  the labor income tax rate,  t δ  the fraction 
of the wage’s present value that she undergoes in the future if she decides not to work in the 
present; that is,  t δ  is the depreciation rate of human capital
2,  t φ  the cost of substituting direct 
child attention for indirect attention, and  t λ  the job search cost. The specification in (2) means 
that if the married woman decides not to work in period t her income will be: 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 − − − − − t t t t t t n w y λ τ δ . 
  The objective is to maximize (1) subject to the constraint: 
  () () [] {} 1 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 + − = + − + + − − − − − − t t t t t t t t t t t t t t b r c b y n n n n w λ φ δ τ    (3) 
where  t b  is the asset at the beginning of period t+1 and  t r  is the interest rate. This restriction 
assumes that the woman can save and acquire debts
3. 
  The solution to the problem implies that she is indifferent to participation or 
nonparticipation at the corner where  t l = 1 , if the wage that she would receive in the labor 
market  t w  is equal to the reservation wage,  t w , plus the job search cost. In other words, an 
interior solution will exist if  1
*
− + > t t t n w w λ . 
 The  period  t decision, conditional on current and future realizations of the exogenous 
variables, can be defined by
4: 
  ) ( 1 1
*
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where 1(.) is the indicator function that is equal to 1 if the expression is true and 0 otherwise
5. 
Empirically the model considered for woman i in period t is: 
  ) 0 ( 1 ) 0 ( 1 1
* ' * > + + = > = − t i t i t i t i t i n X n n µ λ β  ( i = 1, ..,N; t = 1,…T)   (5) 
where  it X  is a vector of observed variables as family composition of woman i, education 
level, and demographic aspects while  it µ  represents the effect of unobserved determinants that 
                                                           
2 This term could also be associated to the indirect effects of fertility explained by Nakamura and Nakamura 
(1992). 
3 The usual terminal conditions that rule out suboptimal decisions are assumed to hold. 
4 Take into account the reparameterization we have made to express search costs in terms of participation (or 
hours) rather than in terms of leisure. Now we have 
* λ  instead of λ . 
5 Notice that the 1 of the indicator function, 1(.), is not the same of time availability: 
t t l n + = 1 .   4
might affect the participation decision. The unobserved heterogeneity term  it µ  might be 
composed by two elements. One which is time invariant that would reflect heterogeneity 
among individuals possibly originated in human capital and other cohort factors denoted by  i ϕ  
and one associated to random transitory movements in wages denoted by  it ν . This term could 
be serially correlated but independent of  it X  for consistency. 
  The specific relationship between fertility and labor participation of married women is 
not that obvious. Econometricians have tried to overcome any potential endogeneity among 
these variables through the use of instruments. However, the instruments currently used are 
not satisfactory (Nakamura and Nakamura, 1992) and, consequently, the correct set of 
instruments remains as an open question. 
  Another issue that we try to capture is the memory of current labor participation; that 
is, we try to answer the question whether the contemporaneous decision on participation 
depends or not on previous decisions about participation in the labor market. This memory 
could be due to both serial persistence and state dependence of female participation. Heckman 
(1981) has made distinctions between serial correlation and state dependence being the latter 
associated to persistent individual heterogeneity (see also Hyslop, 1999). The restriction in 
expression (3), where past participation decisions are present, allows our model to introduce 
the concept of decision memory into play
6. 
 
3. Data construction and empirical facts 
In Colombia there is no panel survey on household labor supply statistics. Thus, to explore the 
life-cycle implications of the neoclassical model the construction of an artificial panel is required. 
This pseudo-panel was built with the information from all stages (quarters) of the National 
Housing Survey (NHS), which are independent cross-sections applied between 1984 and 2000 to 
compile labor market information
7. With this pseudo-panel data analysis it is possible to track 
cohort means (supposedly pertaining to a particular married woman) over time while it is not 
possible with independent cross-sections. 
                                                           
6 Apart from search costs and human capital accumulation and depreciation, imperfect information would give 
rise to the presence of memory in both the theoretical and empirical specification (see Heckman 1981). 
7 Since the year 2000, the National Agency of Statistics (DANE) has been capturing information from the labor 
market through another mechanism called the Continuous Housing Survey.   5
  To construct this artificial panel we invoke the proposal of Deaton (1985) in which the 
population is divided into different groups, or cohorts, to figure on a representative (average) 
agent for each group. Thus, instead of observing different true individuals over time we track 
cohort means
8. 
  In our particular case, for studying the labor participation decisions of married women in 
Colombia we focus on six specific groups of women who were born between 1941 and 1970 as 
presented in Table 1. 
 

















observations in a 
quarter 
Standard 




1  1941 1945  1943  1053  2173  521  341 
2  1946 1950  1948  1434  2899  818  469 
3  1951 1955  1953  1771  3167  980  447 
4  1956 1960  1958  2080  3272  1215  374 
5  1961 1965  1963  2001  2579  1299  321 
6  1966 1970  1968  1364  2513  166  650 
Average       1617       
  Source: Authors’ calculation based on the National Housing Survey (DANE-ENH) 
 
  In other words, we end up with six cohorts of married women who are observed through 
the period of the NHS; that is over 68 quarters, between 1984 and 2000. Summary statistics are 
presented in Table 2 where the simultaneous increase of participation rate and years of education 
and the reduction of wealth is noteworthy. It is also important to observe that the number of 
children increases as long as women are younger; for example, the number of children of age 
between 0 and 1 is higher and gets bigger for women of cohorts 4 to 6. 
  A number of other salient features of the Colombian labor market can be accounted for. 
This is the case of participation over time shown in Figure 1. As predicted by the life-cycle 
model, the rate of participation over time shows an inverted-U behavior: at an early age a woman 
participates less in the labor force, but as long as age and education levels increase, participation 
also increases. After that some other forces start to intervene in the decision; for example, the 
presence of young children, the level of wealth already acquired, and the non-labor income 
                                                           
8 Collado (1997) argues that when the cohort sample means are used as panels these are subject to measurement 
errors. The Monte Carlo simulations that she ran show that the measurement-error correction seems to be 
important in terms of the bias reduction of the corrected estimators. However, that correction is not undertaken 
here.   6
(income of their husbands) reduce the probability of participation. There are, on the other hand, 
forces, like experience, that increase the probability of labor participation. 
 
Table 2. Some characteristics of cohorts 




Age Years  of 
education 
Wealth 
0 – 1   1 – 2   2 – 3  3 - 4  4 - 5  5 – 6 
1  0.324 48.89  6.293  0.8253  0.0138  0.0116 0.0163 0.0209 0.0252 0.0080 
2  0.415 43.85  6.962  0.7359  0.0403  0.0299 0.0379 0.0462 0.0537 0.0212 
3  0.481 38.90  7.632  0.5927  0.0913  0.0610 0.0718 0.0857 0.0925 0.0441 
4  0.501 33.94  8.205  0.4351  0.1715  0.1049 0.1190 0.1308 0.1324 0.0728 
5  0.479 29.08  8.326  0.2952  0.2841  0.1550 0.1596 0.1570 0.1442 0.0817 
6  0.416 24.40  7.919  0.2023  0.3849  0.1697 0.1499 0.1340 0.1096 0.0631 
Average  0.4562 35.29  7.729  0.4852  0.1718  0.0993 0.1070 0.1131 0.1110 0.0593 
The wealth of the family, as a proxy of non-labor income, is computed as a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the family 
either owned a house (without any outstanding mortgage debt), or the neighborhood is middle class or higher (according to 
the official urban classification system), or the family earned $2.500.000 in real terms (Colombian pesos of December 2000); 
otherwise it takes the value of  0.  
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the National Housing Survey (DANE-ENH).  
 
 

































































              Source: Authors’ calculation based on the National Housing Survey 
              (DANE-ENH) 
 
  Figure 2 shows the labor participation rate of each group per age. Labor participation is 
lower for older groups than for younger ones. That is, when people in Group 3 (G3), who were 
born, on average, in 1953, were between 30 and 34 years old they participated less than those of 
Groups 4, 5, and 6 at the same ages. At the same time younger married women tend to participate 
more in the labor force. Figure 3 shows the participation rate of each cohort over time. It is 
remarkable the rapid increase in participation of G6. These facts might be evidence of a cohort 
effect that we will try to consider empirically later on. 
 
   7
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   Source: Authors’ calculation based on the National Housing Survey 
   (DANE-ENH) 
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      Source: Authors’ calculation based on the National Housing Survey 
   (DANE-ENH) 
 
 
  Figure 4 shows the behavior of both the participation rate and the number of years of 
education. The left vertical axis measures the years of education while the right axis measures the 
participation rate. Thus, we can observe that, up to a scale, there is a similarity in the movements 
of the two variables; even more, the peak of education is reached just before the peak of 
participation rate. Figure 5 presents the relationship of the participation rate and education. It 
seems clear that participation increases along with the years of education; however, it also seems 
that two types of women co-exist with education between 4.5 and 8.5 years: one type that 
participates, on average, more than 12 percentage points than the other type. This difference is   8
evident between women with 6.5 and 8.5 years of education. The level of wealth is a plausible 
candidate to explain such a behavior. 
 




















































































      Source: Authors’ calculation based on the National Housing Survey 
   (DANE-ENH) 
 
























              Source: Authors’ calculation based on the National Housing Survey 
              (DANE-ENH) 
 
 
  Another typical determinant of labor force participation is the wealth or non-labor income 
usually regarded as a principal component of the labor opportunity cost or the reservation wage. 
The wealth of the family is set as a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the family either owned 
a house (without any outstanding mortgage debt), or the neighborhood is middle class or 
higher
9, or the family earned $2.500.000 in real terms (Colombian pesos of December 2000); 
otherwise it takes the value of 0. Figure 6 shows the relationship between the participation rate 
                                                           
9 According to the official urban classification system.   9
and our definition of wealth. The probability of participation in the labor market is very small 
when the probability of having wealth is higher than 0.6. 
 
























              Source: Authors’ calculation based on the National Housing Survey 
              (DANE-ENH) 
 
  One of the most interesting aspects of the female participation has to do with costs of 
childcare and fertility decisions. Figure 7 shows the participation of married women ordered 
according to the number of children they have under 6 years of age. From that picture is clear that 
participation is lower when the number of children is also low. This pattern suggests a positive 
relationship among the variables, contrary to that postulated by the theory. To disentangle this 
counterintuitive fact we decompose the children under age six into six categories: children 
between age 0 and 1, between 1 and 2, 2 and 3, 3 and 4, 4 and 5 and, finally between 5 and 6. 
  Figure 8 shows the number of children classified according to age. Thus, 19-year-old 
mothers have, on average, 0.536 children between ages 0 and 1, 0.182 children between ages 1 
and 2, and so on. The conclusion is that younger mothers have younger children. 
  Fertility poses a challenge in the analysis of labor participation since endogeneity might 
be present (Nakamura and Nakamura, 1992). That is, labor participation might affect current or 
future fertility decisions and vice versa. Given the evidence obtained from Figures 9, 10 and 11, 
we observe some potential to this point. Figure 9 presents the labor participation behavior of 
mothers who have at least one child between ages 0 and 1 and no children at any other age. This 
Figure also shows the labor participation of mothers who have at least one child between ages 1 
and 2, and the labor participation of mothers who have at least one child between ages 2 and 3. It   10
seems evident that the labor participation rate of mothers who have children only between ages 0 
and 1 is always lower than that of mothers who have children only between ages 1 and 2, and 
with children only between ages 2 and 3. This result is the same for mothers with children only 
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              Source: Authors’ calculation based on the National Housing Survey 
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      Source: Authors’ calculation based on the National Housing Survey 
   (DANE-ENH) 
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          Source: Authors’ calculation based on the National Housing  
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      Source: Authors’ calculation based on the National Housing Survey 
   (DANE-ENH) 
 
 
  In Figure 11 we observe that the participation of mothers with children only between ages 
0 and 1 and between ages 5 and 6 is similar up until the mother is about 35 years old; for mothers 
older than that, the participation rate is slightly higher for those who have only children between 
ages 5 and 6. Both of them are lower than total participation. That is, participation is negatively 
related to fertility decisions: participation rate of married women with children aged between 0 
and 1 is less than any other participation rate. Also noticeable, the participation rate of married 
women declines over time; this is why participation of mothers with children who are older than 
5 but younger than 6 is also lower than other participation rates.   12
 
Figure 11. Participation rate of mothers with at least one child  
























































      Source: Authors’ calculation based on the National Housing Survey 
   (DANE-ENH) 
 
 
4. Econometric issues, results and discussion 
The theoretical model of Section 2 (appended to the facts showed in the previous section) gives 
rise to some hypothesis that one might verify
10. The econometric exercises carried out in this 
work can be divided into three parts. First, we focus on interest rates and labor income taxes as 
determinants of participation rates. Second, a probit pooling (static) regression is adjusted in 
order to analyze the determinants within this set where unobserved heterogeneity becomes more 
relevant. Third, panel data estimations are carried out. In the latter case we use not only the linear 
probability model to observe the signs and magnitudes of marginal effects under the fixed effects 
estimator, but also the random effects probit estimator. 
  With the linear regressions of each cohort in isolation we verify the power of the interest 
rate factor as well that of labor income taxes
11 to explain the labor participation decision over 
time. Both elements are always present in the Euler equation generated by an optimization 
process. The empirical counterpart we define is given by: 
   ) 0 ( 1 ) 0 ( 1 1
* ' * > + + = > = − t t t t t n X n n µ λ β       (6) 
                                                           
10 Following Deaton (1985), given that cohorts are very different in size each observation has been weighted by 
square root of the cohort size. 
11 The series of labor income taxes was kindly provided by L. Fergusson which was first presented in Fergusson 
(2003).   13
  Hence, we use the model and include the past probability of participation (the latent 
probability
12) which is denoted in Table A1 in the Appendix as lagged participation. The rest of 
the variables in Table A1 are interest rates, labor income taxes, years of education, non-labor 
income (or wealth) defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the family holds the 
conditions mentioned above and 0 otherwise, presence of other people unemployed at home 
which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when there are people undergoing 
unemployment episodes and 0 otherwise, squared age (our proxy of human capital depreciation), 
and the number of children under age 6. The regressions in Table A1 focus on Groups 3 to 6 
given the variability of the dependent variable. 
  The estimates corresponding to past latent participation and presence of other 
unemployed people at home are significant for most of the groups. But the lack of significance of 
interest rates, labor income taxes, and the number of children under age 6
13 is noticeable.  
  To check again the relevance of our intuition, we disaggregate the variable children under 
age 6 to verify the explanatory power of fertility. This is replaced by children between ages 0 and 
1, between ages 1 and 2, 2 and 3, 3 and 4, 4 and 5, and 5 and 6. In this case we have disregarded 
the variable “age” since the inclusion of children at different ages could induce some collinearity 
between these variables. Table A2 presents the results of these regressions which are, again, 
focused on Groups 3 to 6 given the variability of the dependent variable
14. There are two 
regressions which differ only because the first includes children between ages 0 and 1 while the 
second does not. 
  The results in Table A2 (see the Appendix) show that past latent participation probability 
is not significant for Groups 3, 4, 5, and 6. This is also the case with interest rates and labor 
income taxes, but interestingly, and irrespective of the significance, the corresponding 
coefficients of those variables take different signs showing different dominance of substitution 
and income effects depending on the group we are looking at. With respect to children, now 
disaggregated by age, there is a gain since for each group we can observe which of them affect 
the labor participation decision. However, no interesting pattern arises from these regressions 
given that sometimes the coefficients are not significant and sometimes the sign of those 
                                                           
12 Instead of using the past observed decision (which takes the value 0 or 1) we use the latent or underlying 
probability of participation. 
13 The coefficients corresponding to interest rates and taxes could exhibit any sign depending on the dominance of 
income and substitution effects that each variable might generate in turn. 
14 The dependent variable of Groups 1 and 2 takes always the value of 0.    14
coefficients is different form the expected one. In summary, the time series approach to the labor 
participation decision is not illuminating enough about its determinants during the sample period 
for the artificial cohorts we have built. 
  A second exercise we undertake is a probit pooling regression without any dynamics to 
analyze the effect of unobserved heterogeneity. The model is: 
   ) 0 ( 1 ) 0 ( 1
' * > + = > = i i i i X n n µ β        (8) 
  The results of this regression are included in the first two columns of Table 3. Some of the 
estimated probit coefficients have the expected sign. This is the case of education, labor income 
taxes, non-labor income, other people unemployed at home, squared age, children of between 
ages 0-1, 1-2, 4-5, and 5-6. However, the coefficients of children of between ages 2-3 and 3-4 do 
not correspond to the predictions of the theory. As we mentioned above, both labor income taxes 
and interest rates can generate substitution and income effects. According to the sign, the former 
dominates in the case of the two variables. 
 
 
Table 3. Pooled Probit 
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        Note: standard errors are in parenthesis.   15
  However, not all coefficients are significant. This is most noticeable in the cases of taxes, 
non-labor income, and children between ages 2-3, 3-4 and 5-6. Based on the coefficients, the 
probit model seems to be close to the theory and give some importance to unobserved 
heterogeneity since coefficients linked to fertility are now significant. However, regardless of 
having the signs predicted by the theory, the marginal effects analysis suggests that no variable is 
really significant in the model for the whole sample period. However, for a shorter period of time 
(1990:1-2000:4), education and others unemployed at home, as evidence of the “additional 
worker effect”, are significant on the grounds of marginal effects. 
  Then, we turn to panel analysis. Participation decisions of married women pose some 
problems given the treatment of unobserved heterogeneity either as fixed or random, the 
incidental parameters problem, the potential endogeneity of fertility decisions
15, the serial 
persistence-state dependence phenomena, and the initial conditions for the dynamic process given 
the intrinsic nonlinearity of a probit model. 
 Consider  again  Equation (5) which is written here for convenience: 
  ) 0 ( 1 ) 0 ( 1 1
* ' * > + + = > = − t i t i t i t i t i n X n n µ λ β  ( i = 1, ..,N; t = 1,…T)   (5) 
where the term  it µ  referred to unobserved heterogeneity is composed by two elements as we 
stated above:  i ϕ  and  it ν . The first represents heterogeneity among individuals originated in 
factors such as human capital and other cohort factors and the second associated to random 
transitory movements in wages. The fixed effects probit model regards  i ϕ  as parameters to be 
estimated together with β  since this procedure does not require any assumption about the 
distribution of  i ϕ  given  it X . Unfortunately the joint estimation of  i ϕ  and β  generates the 
problem of incidental parameters. This difficulty arises because of the nonlinear underlying 
nature of the probit model which leads to inconsistent log-likelihood estimation of β  with T 
fixed and  ∞ → N  (see Wooldridge, 2002, chapter 15). In other words, the estimation of β  
could change as long as new observations are added to the sample. 
  The dynamics of the labor participation, observed through the high degree of memory, is 
an important characteristic of this individual´s decision. Associated to the memory of 
participation are the problems of initial conditions and persistence-state dependence. The former 
                                                           
15 This problem is not addressed here on the grounds that the set of instruments currently used in the literature is 
not satisfactory (Nakamura and Nakamura, 1992). However, children between ages 0 and 1 are not included in 
the regressions when state dependence is explicitly considered.   16
arises since the participation process is not observed at the moment of entrance to the labor age 
(which takes place in Colombia when people are at least 12 years old) and, as a result, something 
must be assumed about the first decision of labor participation ( 0 i n ) and its relationship to other 
determinants. A misspecification of the initial conditions will also lead to inconsistent estimates 
ofβ . To deal with this issue, given the random effects approach used, we follow the procedure 
of Wooldridge (2002) which decompose  it µ  into  i ϕ ,  0 i n ,  i X  and  it ς . 
  As for the serial persistence problem, the literature recognizes a difference between 
state dependence and persistence. The former is explained on the basis of human capital 
accumulation and job search costs
16; these are reasons to observe that individuals, with some 
observable characteristics, decide for an option with higher probability when they have made 
the same decision in the past. The latter might be caused by persistent individual heterogeneity 
through which there is a high probability to take a labor participation decision but without 
regard to previous choices. 
  Then, focusing on the estimation, if we assume for the moment that  it ν  is serially 
uncorrelated, it could be of some interest to consider the fixed effect linear probability model 
which has the appeal that, as stated above, does not make any assumption on the distribution 
of  i ϕ . This model controls for any arbitrary correlation between  i ϕ  and  it X  and can help to 
eliminate the incidental parameters due to the form of controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity which consists of differencing the processes. A disadvantage of the linear 
probability model is that one can account for the fact that its forecasts are not restricted to the 
[0, 1] interval. For this exercise we restrict ourselves to the shorter sample period and use the 
variables that (according to previous exercises) have been more promising. At the same time, 
to avoid the problem of potential endogeneity between the labor participation decision and 
fertility we discard the children between 0 and 1 years of age taking into account that past 
participation probability has been included as an explanatory variable. Results in Table 4 
suggest that the performance of this model is rather poor in terms of significance of the 
estimated coefficients and the sign of the coefficient corresponding to education. For the fixed 
effects model, the ρ  coefficient is high enough (0.3813) which might be an indication that the 
variability explained by the fixed component of the model is important to some extent. 
                                                           
16 Non-separability of preferences is also a possible source of state dependence.   17
Table 4. Linear Probability Model (1990:1-2000:4) 






































2 0.0366  0.6619 
ρ (fraction of variance due to  i ϕ )  0.5361 
ϕ σ   0.3813 
Correlation ( i ϕ , it X )  0.0849 
 
ν σ   0.3547 0.2732 
   Note: standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
  Then we estimate a linear probability model assuming that  i ϕ  is not correlated to  it X , or 
that  it µ  is a correlated random effect (model in levels in Table 4). In this case, not only the 
significance but also the sign and the magnitude of the estimates coefficients change with respect 
to the fixed effect linear probability model. The random specification suggests that, after 
controlling for seasonal effects, past participation, non-labor income, and children between ages 1 
and 2 are the main determinants of married women’s participation (see Table 4). However, the 
results must be interpreted with some caution given the length of time (T) versus the size of 
individuals (N). 
  Under the assumption that  it µ  is a correlated random effect we can use probit models. 
This kind of models parameterize the distributions of  i ϕ . Table 5 shows that, controlling for 
initial conditions and seasonal effects, there is evidence of true state-dependence, all variables 
have the sign predicted by the theory and all of them, except for non-labor income, are 
significant. Nevertheless, according to the ρ  coefficient, there is no panel effect so that the 
model is equivalent to a pooled probit. The marginal effects are significant for all variables 
and have the expected sign, which suggest that the variables are relevant. 
   18
Table 5. Panel Probit: Random Effects (1990:1-2000:4) 








































ρ  8.32e-07   
ϕ σ   0.0009   




This paper analyzes the labor participation decision of married women in Colombia within a life-
cycle framework. By employing the information of the NHS we built a pseudo-panel and end up 
with 6 groups that we regard as 6 different women. Given the difficulties posed by this topic we 
undertake an exploratory tour by using different specifications that allow us to arrive at some 
significant conclusions. 
 Some  important  facts  can be sketched directly from the data. This is the case of the 
behavior of participation curve which takes the form of an inverted-U as age of women increases. 
Another finding is related to higher participation rates in the labor market of younger women a 
fact possibly linked to their higher education level. The data also suggests a negative relationship 
between participation and wealth and an effect of fertility on the participation decision. 
  Within a neoclassical framework, variables such as interest rates, labor income taxes, 
education, wealth (non-labor income), presence of others unemployed at home, squared age, and 
fertility, represented by children of ages from 0 up to 6 are used to model the participation 
decision of married women (or in common-law unions). 
  Children under age 6, when considered as a whole, are not significant. The same 
conclusion is obtained with wealth; however, this variable appears most of the time with the   19
expected sign. Intertemporal decisions based on the behavior of interest rates are not relevant for 
the participation decision.  
  After controlling for seasonal effects, memory of decisions about labor participation is an 
important variable as well as education, labor income taxes, the presence of other people 
unemployed at home, and children between ages 1 and 2. Once this set of explanatory variables is 
included into the model, unobserved heterogeneity does not play any role in determining the 
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Appendix : Time series regressions for participation decision of married women 
 
Table A1. Coefficients of models of group participation over time 
Cohort  Coefficient  Standard error  Coefficient  Standard error 
Constant 
G3  -0.6363 0.8107  -0.1406 0.7413 
G4  0.3010 0.5145  0.5149  0.5255 
G5  1.6099 0.4579  1.6191  0.4558 
G6  -0.1608 0.1957  -0.2016  0.1819 
Past (latent) participation probability 
G3  0.1315 0.0594  0.1030 0.0566 
G4  0.0695 0.0329  0.0521  0.0333 
G5  0.0656 0.0264  0.0729  0.0243 
G6  -0.0412 0.0271  -0.0519  0.0238 
Interest rate 
G3  0.0000 0.0003  0.0002 0.0003 
G4  -0.0000 0.0001  0.0000  0.0001 
G5  -0.0001 0.0001  -0.0001  0.0001 
G6  -0.0001 0.0001  -0.0001  0.0001 
Labor income taxes 
G3  -0.0025 0.0014  -0.0033  0.0013 
G4  0.0004 0.0007  0.0000  0.0007 
G5  -0.0008 0.0007  -0.0004  0.0006 
G6  0.0024 0.0009  -0.0018  0.0007 
Education 
G3  0.0088 0.0077  0.0006  0.0053 
G4  0.0002 0.0045  -0.0067  0.0035 
G5  -0.0102 0.0039  -0.0082  0.0028 
G6  -0.0021 0.0046  -0.0053  0.0026 
Non labor income (or wealth) 
G3  0.1563 0.1003  0.0154  0.0104 
G4  0.0008 0.0071  0.0055  0.0071 
G5  0.0047 0.0070  0.0032  0.0067 
G6  0.0034 0.0096  0.0061  0.0091 
Presence of other unemployed people at home 
G3  0.1407 0.0603  0.1644  0.0586 
G4  -1.0119 0.0365  -0.0510  0.0304 
G5  -0.1167 0.0307  -0.1222  0.0297 
G6  0.0609 0.0539  0.0474  0.0513 
Age 
G3  -0.0040 0.0028 
G4  -0.0053 0.0022 
G5  0.0016 0.0023 
G6  -0.0024 0.0029 
 
Squared age 
G3  0.0000 0.0000  2.08e-06  0.0000 
G4  0.0001 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
G5  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
G6  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Children 
G3  0.0061 0.0177  -0.0004  0.0172 
G4  0.0116 0.0120  -0.0034  0.0105 
G5  -0.0119 0.0096  -0.0089  0.0086 
G6  -0.0014 0.0092  -0.0035  0.008 
R
23  0.8339 0.8319 
R
24  0.8065 0.7879 
R
25  0.8532 0.8518 
R
26  0.8339 
Df = 57 
0.8319 
Df = 58 
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Table A2. Coefficients of models of group participation over time 
Cohort Coefficient Standard error  Coefficient Standard  error 
Constant 
G3  0.0203 0.7957  0.1574  0.7738 
G4  1.0150 0.4600  1.0060  0.4497 
G5  1.1299 0.5031  0.9523  0.4853 
G6  -0.2570 0.2307  -0.3146  0.2274 
Past (latent) participation probability 
G3  0.0702 0.0617  0.0889  0.0568 
G4  0.0449 0.0310  0.0439  0.0295 
G5  0.0628 0.0255  0.0572  0.0252 
G6  -0.0572 0.0251  -0.0613  0.0250 
Interest rate 
G3  0.0003 0.0003  0.0003  0.0003 
G4  -0.0001 0.0001  -0.0001  0.0001 
G5  -0.0003 0.0001  -0.0003  0.0001 
G6  -0.0000 0.0001  -0.0001  0.0001 
Labor income taxes 
G3  -0.0041 0.0017  -0.0034  0.0015 
G4  -0.0004 0.0009  -0.0005  0.0008 
G5  -0.0005 0.0007  -0.0009  0.0006 
G6  0.0026 0.0009  0.0021  0.0008 
Education 
G3  0.0036 0.0066  0.0029  0.0066 
G4  -0.0056 0.0038  -0.0057  0.0038 
G5  0.0000 0.0033  -0.0009  0.0033 
G6  -0.0021 0.0038  -0.0045  0.0033 
Non labor income (or wealth) 
G3  0.0149 0.0110  0.0144  0.0109 
G4  0.0015 0.0070  0.0015  0.0070 
G5  0.0060 0.0061  0.0073  0.0061 
G6  -0.0087 0.0103  -0.0048  0.0099 
Presence of other unemployed people at home 
G3  0.1685 0.0567  0.1795  0.0548 
G4  -0.0774 0.0327  -0.0790  0.0296 
G5  -0.1054 0.0305  -0.1181  0.0289 
G6  -0.0264 0.0808  -0.0370  0.0808 
Squared age 
G3  8.70e-06 0.0000  -6.64e-06  0.00004 
G4  0.0000 0.0000  0.00004  0.00003 
G5  8.90e-06 0.0000  0.00003  0.00003 
G6  0.0000 0.0000  0.00007  0.00004 
Children 0-1 
G3  0.1183 0.1499 
G4  -0.0065 0.0547 
G5  -0.0395 0.0315 
G6  -0.0395 0.0314 
 
Children 1-2 
G3  -0.3289 0.1780  -0.2584  0.1534 
G4  0.1515 0.0774  0.1493  0.0746 
G5  0.0102 0.0598  -0.0130  0.0572 
G6  -0.0715 0.0582  -0.0792  0.0582 
Children 2-3 
G3  0.4018 0.1478  0.4364  0.1406 
G4  0.1614 0.0798  0.1577  0.0727 
G5  -0.0605 0.0750  -0.0726  0.0747 
G6  0.0413 0.0611  0.0214  0.0594 
Children 3-4 
G3  -0.1433 0.1851  -0.1092  0.1794 
G4  -0.0881 0.0706  -0.0914  0.0644 
G5  0.0797 0.0452  0.0691  0.0446 
G6  0.1065 0.0649  0.1006  0.0651 
Children 4-5 
G3  -0.1105 0.1296  -0.1241  0.1280 
G4  -0.1629 0.0647  -0.1630  0.0641 
G5  -0.0681 0.0529  -0.0593  0.0527 
G6  -0.1967 0.0734  -0.1704  0.0708 
Children 5-6 
G3  0.0017 0.1898  0.0273  0.1863 
G4  -0.1374 0.0754  -0.1356  0.0731 
G5  -0.1565 0.0459  -0.1457  0.0453 
G6  -.00266 0.0598  0.0054  0.0545 
R
23  0.6642 0.6603 
R
24  0.8635 0.8634 
R
25  0.9016 0.8986 
R
26  0.8560 
Df = 53 
0.8517 
Df = 54 
 